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The aim of the paper is to analyse how credit crunch has modified the traditional 
bank-firm relationship with a particular attention to the Italian situation. Our 
analysis reinforces the finding that in Italy, the credit available to the real economy 
is insufficient in terms not only of quantity but also of quality. The subsequent step 
is to identify and discuss possible exit strategies for eliminating the credit crunch 
and to overcome serious intrinsic shortcomings in terms of alternative 
instruments, markets and intermediaries. In fact, if on the one hand the crisis has 
revealed the underdevelopment of the Italian financial market, the insufficient role 
of institutional investors, the embryonic state of the corporate bond markets and 
the virtual non-existence of commercial paper markets; on the other hand, it could 
finally provide the opportunity for the development of these channels. The 
changing role of banks in the new scenario is also analysed as well as the 
characteristics firms will require to benefit from it.  
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The second wave of the financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis, which started in 
2010, hit Italian banks hard, and since 2011 it has been causing a severe credit 
crunch for households and non financial corporations. 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the way in which the credit crunch is leading to 
what has now become a structural disintermediation within the banking channel, 
and has also modified the traditional bank-firm relationship. As a consequence of 
these changes, action is required on the entire structure of the Italian financial 
system, to overcome serious intrinsic shortcomings in terms of instruments, 
markets and intermediaries.  
To discuss these points, the paper is organised as follows. The first part will 
analyse the characteristics of and current trends within Europe’s main financial 
systems: those of Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain. The aim is 
to assess the extent to which the banking system is central to companies’ financial 
strategies, with a focus on the different size categories. We then move on to briefly 
describe the impact of the crisis on the Euro area credit markets, the process of 
fragmentation of the single financial market along national lines and the actions 
taken by the European Central Banks to combat this trend. The next step is to 
consider the trend in bank lending to non financial corporations during the last 
few years for each of the main European countries, in order to assess the 
significance of financial constraints and the severity of any credit crunches. The 
findings reveal that in Italy, above all, there are clear signs of a credit crunch, 
affecting SMEs in particular. 
The final step is to identify and discuss possible exit strategies for eliminating the 
credit crunch in Italy: one possible way of overcoming financial constraints is for 
firms to turn to the bond and equity markets, which would require the 
involvement of new categories of financial intermediaries (institutional investors, 
equity funds and venture capitalists) and the emergence of new financial operators 
and vehicles (credit funds), as well as private and public guaranties for the 
securitisation of firms’ loans, together with new funding platforms 
(crowdfunding). The changing role of banks in the new scenario is analysed as well 
as the characteristics businesses will require to benefit from it. 
 
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES IN EUROPE 
The last two decades have seen profound changes in the structures of the main 
financial systems, and in operators’ financial behaviours. In the financial literature 
(Thakor, 1996; Allen and Gale, 1999), the financial system of Continental Europe 
has been described as a bank-based intermediation model, contrasting with the 
Anglo-Saxon model, in which flows of finance pass mainly through the financial 
markets. For the theoretical and empirical literature are clear the implications of 
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these two models, in terms of economic growth and the allocation and 
management of risks between operators. Bank-centred systems are considered to 
provide better intertemporal distribution of risks (Allen and Gale, 1995) but to be 
less effective in supporting new business ventures and technological innovations 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
The development trends of the financial systems considered, over the medium-
long term, are analysed using the harmonised statistics produced by Eurostat - 
Financial accounts (1995-2011), after which we focus on the structural changes 
reflected in the evolution of financial aggregates and balance sheet structures for 
non-financial corporations in a number of key European countries: Italy, France, 
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
 
Table 1 Financial Intensity Ratio: Non-financial corporations Financial 
Liabilities/GDP - (amount outstanding) 
 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Italy 1.55 2.13 2.19 2.32 2.34 2.30 2.28 2.18 
France 1.90 3.60 3.34 3.95 3.14 3.59 3.66 3.43 
Germany 1.36 1.90 1.77 1.92 1.72 1.87 1.89 1.81 
Spain 1.63 2.70 3.31 3.81 3.31 3.37 3.34 3.12 
United Kingdom 2.22 2.95 2.65 2.73 2.49 2.69 2.72 2.59 
Source: Our processing of Eurostat Financial Accounts 
 
Within the Italian financial system, the level of indebtedness of non-financial 
corporations continues to be lower than that of the other Euro area states, with the 
sole exception of Germany. All countries show a slowdown in the indebtedness of 
non-financial corporations, with the ratio falling from the peak recorded in 2007 
(Table 1).  
The financial surplus/deficit trend enables us to assess the extent of the 
imbalances arising from operators’ real savings and investment decisions, and 
these imbalances’ effects on the creation of financial assets and investment trends. 
A net financial surplus or deficit indicates whether an institutional sector is 
tending to be a net lender or borrower, while an analysis of changes in the financial 
assets and liabilities structure enables us to assess to what extent financial 
investments and new loans originate from real imbalances or are merely reflecting 
operators’ tendency to focus on the financial dimensions of their balance sheets.  
 
Table 2 Financial surplus/deficit of non-financial corporations 
(percentage of GDP)  
 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Italy -3.8 -4.9 -3.6 -2.7 -4.9 -1.6 -2.1 -2.1 
France -1.9 -1.7 -1.9 -1.8 -2.9 -0.8 -0.9 -2.3 
Germany 4.6 -5.0 1.4 10.8 -3.5 2.4 0.7 0.0 
Spain 0.7 -4.3 -7.4 -11.5 -6.7 -0.4 1.6 1.1 
United Kingdom 1.1 -1.0 2.3 2.1 2.8 3.3 4.7 4.1 
Source: Our processing of Eurostat Financial Accounts 
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If we focus our attention on the trend in indebtedness of non-financial 
corporations, Italian firms consistently show a net financial deficit. In 2011 this 
deficit amounted to -2.1 per cent of GDP (Table 2).  
An initial assessment of the way in which financial variables affect the operations 
of SMEs in the various countries surveyed can be made by examining firms’ 
financial structures, considering both indebtedness levels, meaning their degree of 
dependence on external sources of finance, and the breakdown of borrowing by 
technical form and the type of intermediary involved. A greater or lesser degree of 
capitalisation, varying levels of dependence on bank lending, and the prevalence of 
medium-long term loans, are all good indicators of SMEs’ relationship with the 
financial system in the various countries, and these features also affect firms’ 
economic soundness and growth prospects. 
During the period under consideration, the variation in the volumes of financial 
intermediation and the trend in net financial surpluses/deficits were accompanied 
by major changes in the composition of investors’ financial portfolios. The 
breakdown of companies’ sources of finance is illustrated with reference to total 
stocks of financial liabilities (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Non-financial corporations: breakdown of liabilities^ 
(percentage composition) 
  Debt 
Securities 













Italy 1995 1.53 47.51 59.37 10.15 5.04 35.78 
 2000 1.27 39.85 55.81 29.60 4.40 24.89 
 2005 3.27 46.64 39.36 18.74 5.22 26.12 
 2007 3.04 49.40 38.47 18.89 4.75 23.91 
 2008 2.95 55.75 36.95 10.80 5.02 25.48 
 2009 3.82 54.43 31.93 13.08 4.91 23.76 
 2010 4.32 52.68 32.12 12.98 4.64 25.38 
 2011 4.01 53.61 33.67 10.81 4.59 26.98 
France 1995 8.82 42.71 21.10 18.79 0.00 29.68 
 2000 7.91 30.62 27.65 40.56 0.00 20.91 
 2005 8.99 35.76 29.90 33.29 0.00 21.96 
 2007 6.63 36.15 28.80 36.09 0.00 21.14 
 2008 7.96 43.75 28.15 23.96 0.00 24.33 
 2009 9.28 39.99 26.83 27.49 0.00 23.24 
 2010 9.73 38.87 26.75 27.86 0.00 23.53 
 2011 10.43 40.24 26.74 24.19 0.00 25.14 
Germany 1995 2.77 43.60 33.04 20.88 6.88 25.86 
 2000 1.74 37.60 34.10 33.17 5.59 21.90 
 2005 3.52 39.34 32.10 27.35 6.81 22.98 
 2007 3.29 36.52 32.33 32.83 5.98 21.37 
 2008 4.16 42.50 33.53 21.26 6.63 25.46 
 2009 3.98 42.00 33.00 22.61 6.49 24.92 
 2010 3.98 41.23 35.43 25.79 6.18 22.82 
 2011 4.15 44.35 37.47 21.92 6.23 23.35 
Spain 1995 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
 2000 1.43 41.49 24.33 25.33 0.51 31.24 
 5 
 2005 0.58 49.27 20.11 20.52 0.10 29.53 
 2007 0.48 51.94 17.61 21.57 0.00 26.00 
 2008 0.56 59.61 16.69 14.45 0.00 25.39 
 2009 0.61 61.14 13.34 15.51 0.00 22.74 
 2010 0.56 61.57 12.49 14.55 0.00 23.32 
 2011 0.64 62.80 11.70 12.77 0.00 23.79 
UK 1997 7.33 24.71 62.15 59.62 0.00 8.34 
 2000 9.78 23.85 53.47 60.18 0.00 6.19 
 2005 12.47 35.11 53.22 46.42 0.00 6.00 
 2007 12.03 37.15 59.40 45.40 0.00 5.41 
 2008 13.02 47.85 59.03 33.26 0.00 5.87 
 2009 14.06 39.97 56.40 40.59 0.00 5.38 
 2010 11.67 39.19 54.92 43.94 0.00 5.20 
 2011 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Source: Our processing of Eurostat Financial Accounts 
^ Total liabilities are indicated net of : currency and deposits, derivatives, unlisted shares. 
 
If, within the institutional sectors, attention is focused on companies’ financial 
structures, a number of important differences between the behaviour of Italian 
businesses and those of their European competitors emerge. European non-
financial corporations show a clear preference for bank loans, especially in Spain 
and Italy, where on average loans account for more than 50 per cent of total 
financial liabilities. If we exclude unlisted shareholdings, the second largest item in 
terms of size is listed shares, the value of which reflects the trend on the stock 
market: in almost all countries except Germany, this item peaked in 2000 and fell 
drastically from 2008 onwards. 
In Italy, specifically, bank lending is particularly important, accounting for almost 
54 per cent of total financial liabilities at the end of the period; as a logical 
consequence, listed shares (11 per cent) and debt securities (4 per cent) are less 
significant for Italian firms. However, the increase in the proportion of debt 
securities recorded in all countries, with the sole exception of Germany, during 
2008/2009 should be underlined. Last but not least, the Other accounts 
payable/receivable heading appears to account for a similar proportion of the 
financial liabilities of all non-financial corporations; in this case, it is in the United 
Kingdom that the item is least significant. 
Further pointers can be derived from the prevalence or otherwise of medium-long 
term loans. There is a very high degree of variation in the duration of bank loans 
from country to country, reflecting the differences in the bank-firm relationship in 
the main systems examined. In Italy, where short-term indebtedness has always 
been the rule, during the last few years the balance of the financial structure has 
improved, with short-term borrowing accounting for little more than 1/3 of total 
bank credit. 
It is also worth assessing the differences in financial structure between the 
companies in different size categories. However, assessing European SMEs’ forms 
of financing by size categories is highly problematical due to the differences in the 
ways financial statements are drafted in the various countries. Generally, the BACH 
harmonised database is the only reliable source for comparing the performance of 
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European firms1. It provides the basis for an international comparison between 
companies in different size categories with the aid of information drawn above all 
from the national financial statement databases and surveys carried out by the 
main countries’ central banks. When examining the main financial statement of 
indicators of SMEs compared to companies in other size categories, it is important 
to remember that the BACH database’s coverage of SMEs is much more limited 
than that of medium and large-sized firms. In particular, within the small 
enterprises category it underestimates the number of extremely small businesses, 
which are generally also the most financially and economically fragile.  
Table 4 contains the main financial structure indicators for the various company 
size categories for 1999-2011, for the European countries under consideration. 
 
Table 4 Breakdown of liabilities of European firms by size class 
Capital and reserves as % of (liabilities + capital + reserves) 
  Small Medium Large Total 
Italy 2000 24.9 24.5 28.4 27.2 
 2005 25.1 26.9 29.3 28.4 
 2007 24.6 26.1 28.8 27.9 
 2008 30.0 29.2 29.8 29.7 
 2009 31.3 31.1 30.5 30.7 
 2010 30.2 30.9 31.4 31.2 
 2011 30.2 30.9 30.8 30.8 
France 2000 32.1 30.9 24.6 27.1 
 2005 32.0 33.5 31.4 31.9 
 2007 31.5 33.4 32.2 32.3 
 2008 31.6 33.7 30.2 31.0 
 2009 32.4 33.6 30.5 31.3 
 2010 32.7 33.6 32.8 32.9 
 2011 31.0 33.8 31.1 31.5 
Germany 2000 19.5 28.5 27.3 27.1 
 2005 29.1 32.8 30.4 30.6 
 2007 30.5 32.7 31.1 31.3 
 2008 31.0 33.6 29.6 30.2 
 2009 32.2 34.5 30.3 30.9 
 2010 33.4 35.7 31.9 32.4 
 2011 34.8 35.5 31.8 32.3 
Spain 2000 39.1 44.2 39.5 39.9 
 2005 40.2 42.1 36.3 38.1 
 2007 40.3 40.1 35.4 37.2 
 2008 41.6 42.0 34.3 36.5 
 2009 42.5 42.1 35.1 37.8 
 2010 44.4 40.7 35.8 38.6 
 2011 46.8 40.7 35.2 38.5 
Bank debt in % total debt 
  Small Medium Large Total 
Italy 2000 31.4 31.4 21.9 25.0 
 2005 33.1 31.5 18.6 22.8 
 2007 35.3 33.8 18.2 23.0 
 2008 37.0 34.5 19.3 24.2 
 2009 37.3 34.4 18.2 23.2 
 2010 37.7 34.5 18.6 23.5 
 2011 37.7 35.0 19.0 23.5 
France 2000 25.4 22.8 10.8 15.2 
                                                        
1 The BACH (Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised) database supplies harmonised information on the 
financial statements of non-financial corporations in 12 countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain). The data are grouped by area of business 
(NACE classification) and size of business (turnover), on the basis of a uniform accounting framework.  
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 2005 25.7 21.1 10.2 14.8 
 2007 28.3 22.2 12.6 17.2 
 2008 30.5 23.8 13.3 18.1 
 2009 31.6 24.8 13.1 18.1 
 2010 31.6 25.6 13.3 18.6 
 2011 31.5 26.3 12.3 18.1 
Germany 2000 44.1 43.5 13.7 19.0 
 2005 45.6 40.6 11.0 17.0 
 2007 44.4 37.8 11.2 16.5 
 2008 45.5 39.1 12.5 17.5 
 2009 45.8 39.2 12.0 17.2 
 2010 45.9 38.7 11.6 16.7 
 2011 47.9 41.7 11.5 16.1 
Spain 2000 38.3 35.1 19.1 24.3 
 2005 43.5 39.9 20.3 28.9 
 2007 40.7 42.6 27.4 32.4 
 2008 41.1 43.3 28.7 32.2 
 2009 43.4 44.6 28.1 33.5 
 2010 42.2 45.4 30.4 34.7 
 2011 40.3 44.4 31.7 34.7 
Short-term bank indebtedness as % of total liabilities to banks 
  Small Medium Large Total 
Italy 2000 69.5 73.9 67.5 69.6 
 2005 63.5 65.7 47.8 55.4 
 2007 62.8 65.4 48.2 55.6 
 2008 62.0 66.3 48.6 55.9 
 2009 58.2 61.2 43.4 50.9 
 2010 57.7 60.0 45.1 51.4 
 2011 59.3 62.1 48.5 53.8 
France 2000 23.1 31.8 39.1 32.7 
 2005 19.1 26.2 29.8 25.6 
 2007 15.6 22.2 20.8 19.5 
 2008 14.0 21.2 22.3 19.6 
 2009 12.4 16.5 15.0 14.4 
 2010 11.2 14.3 15.5 13.9 
 2011 10.1 13.5 19.0 14.9 
Germany 2000 39.0 30.6 34.0 33.6 
 2005 36.9 28.7 28.4 29.9 
 2007 27.6 25.4 35.0 31.1 
 2008 27.1 24.4 32.6 29.5 
 2009 26.3 22.2 26.3 25.1 
 2010 25.6 22.5 23.8 23.7 
 2011 25.0 23.7 24.8 24.5 
Spain 2000 51.2 55.0 34.7 42.5 
 2005 44.1 47.8 26.8 37.3 
 2007 36.0 44.4 31.9 35.0 
 2008 29.1 47.2 38.5 37.2 
 2009 23.2 37.7 33.1 30.5 
 2010 23.4 36.2 31.5 29.8 
 2011 23.3 35.4 31.5 30.1 
Source: Our processing of BACH data set 
 
Except for the German situation for the period under consideration, with regard to 
the capitalisation indicator, there are no substantial differences between the 
different size categories of company. It is interesting to note that small and 
medium Spanish enterprises have a higher degree of capitalisation than the 
country’s large companies. However, it should be remembered that the database 
used tends to underestimate the proportion of very small businesses, which 
normally have a much lower level of capitalisation than other firms.  
Bank indebtedness accounts for a significant proportion of small enterprises’ 
financial liabilities, but this proportion decreases significantly as the firm’s size 
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increases. This is consistent with large European corporations’ tendency to make 
greater use of the bond market as an alternative to bank loans. 
Last but not least, there is a very high degree of variation in the duration of bank 
loans from country to country, reflecting the differences in the bank-firm 
relationship in the main systems examined.  
From this initial survey, it is quite clear that the structure of the financial system 
varies from country to country, with banks paying the central role in financing 
non-financial corporations, especially those of smallest size: this applies in 
particular to Italy, Spain and Germany. This makes it particularly important to 
investigate the way in which the crisis, and especially the sovereign debt crisis, has 
impacted on firms’ ability to finance their operations, distinguishing borrowers by 
company size category where possible. 
 
 
3. THE CRISIS AND THE CREDIT MARKET IN THE EURO AREA 
During the first few years of its existence, the Euro area witnessed a growing 
convergence of the different member states’ financial markets, in a progression 
towards a single financial market. However, since the beginning of the crisis, and 
especially the sovereign debt phase, the Euro area has experienced the opposite 
trend, with severe fragmentation of the single financial market along national lines. 
Since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in the peripheral states - Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland and then, since summer 2011, Spain and Italy - the credit 
markets have become strongly differentiated, with disparities from country to 
country in the growth of lending and the cost of credit. 
 
Figure 1 Lending(1) by borrower sector (12-month percentage change) 
 
Source: Banca d’Italia 2013, Annual Report 2012, Figure 7.6  
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Figure 1 describes the growth in lending since 2010 for non-financial corporations 
and households in selected Euro-area countries. For non-financial corporations the 
divergence of growth in lending has increased since 2012: the trend is a negative 
one for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and particularly severe for Spain; it is 
slightly positive for Germany and France; positive for the Netherlands.  
The cost of bank financing differs in the various countries, with an increasing level 
of divergence. A recent analysis of lending rates in the Euro area (Neri, 2013) 
reveals that for non-financial corporations the standard deviation of interest rates 
on loans increased only slightly during the first phase of the crisis, from 0.6 
percentage points (2003-summer 2007) to 0.7 (September 2007- April 2010), but 
rose to 1.4 percentage points during the sovereign debt crisis. In this phase the 
variation in the cost of new loans reflected a strong correlation of lending rates 
with sovereign spreads.  
One clear indicator of the fragmentation of the credit markets is the differentials in 
the cost of credit for corporations between peripheral and core countries. Interest 
rates on loans to businesses, which until 2011 were more or less the same in Italy 
(about 5 per cent) and Germany (about 4.7 per cent) have since strongly diverged: 
in 2013, Germany corporations are financing their operations on average at a cost 
of 3 per cent, as are those in France, while both Italian and Spanish corporations 
are paying rates of more than 6 per cent.   
The trend in the differentials in interest rates on bank loans to firms between Italy 
and the Euro area is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Interest rates on bank loans to firms (monthly data; per cent) 
 
(1) New transactions other than current accounts.  
Source: Banca d’Italia 2013, Annual Report 2012, Figure 14.9 a 
 
The negative effects of this financial fragmentation are particularly damaging for 
SMEs: the interest rate differential between new small and large (over one million 
Euro) loans in 2012 averaged about 150 basis points, compared to about 80 during 
2003-2009 (Banca d’Italia 2013b, p. 78). The divergence in interest rate 
differentials between peripheral and core countries is particularly high: it is 2.3 
percentage points in Spain but just one point in France (Draghi, 2013). 
In a single currency area, domestic markets severely fragmented along national 
lines hamper the transmission of monetary policy and are an obstacle to the 
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communication of uniform messages across the economies of the various States. 
The use of non-standard monetary policy instruments by the European Central 
Bank starting in 2011 and 2012 (the Securities Market Program SMP, the Long 
Term Refinancing Operations LTROs and the announced Outright Monetary 
Transactions OMTs) and the transfusion of large amounts of liquidity onto the 
market, have all been intended to restore the proper transmission of monetary 
policy in the financial market (Draghi, 2012). 
Italian banks have made ample use of the refinancing on offer from the ECB, 
especially the LTROs of December 2011 and February 2013, receiving about 25 per 
cent of all the funds granted. In spite of this, and notwithstanding official interest 
rates which have been gradually reduced to levels close to zero, Italian banks’ 
lending volumes and the interest rates charged are being adversely affected by a 
number of key factors: initially, from 2011, these were the credit squeeze and the 
higher cost of borrowing on the markets due to the sovereign risk and the 
tightening of capital ratios (Cosma and Gualandri, 2012). Since 2012, other factors 
related to the increased risk level within the economy due to the ongoing serious 
recession have made their effects felt: in Italy, GDP fell by seven percentage points 
in real terms between 2007 and 2012, while industrial output slumped by 25 per 
cent. This has triggered a considerable rise in the rate of non performing loans 
(NPLs) and especially of defaults, and a decrease in the coverage ratio (provisions 
for NPLs in relation to NPLs), leading to the need for additional large provisions to 
cover bad debts. The rate of NPLs rose from 4.5 per cent at the end of 2007 to 12.3 
per cent in June 2012, while during the same period the coverage ratio fell from 
49.4per cent to 37.7 per cent (Banca d’Italia 2013a and 2013b). In 2102, the Bank 
of Italy (Banca d’Italia, 2013c) performed in-depth checks, with on site 
supervision, on the country’s 20 biggest banks (except for the two largest), which 
led to higher provisions for default and raised the coverage ratio for the sample of 
positions analysed from 31 per cent at 30 September 2012 to 43.5 per cent at 31 
December 2012. These checks are continuing in 2013 and are expected to lead to 
further provisions2.  
In the meantime, the introduction of Basel 3 and in particular the new rules 
regarding capital adequacy, liquidity and stable funding have produced further 
pressures on Italian banks. Moreover, the higher risk associated to the present 
economic conditions, as described above, has created a bias towards investments 
in national government bonds, also due to their eligibility for the ECB refinancing.  
The final result of this situation is the the emergence of a severe credit crunch. 
Banks have implemented strict creditworthiness assessment procedures, with 
strong rationing to low rated firms, and an increase in the cost of lending to cover 




                                                        
2 It should be remembered that the criteria for defining NPLs are stricter in Italy than in other European States 
(Banca d’Italia, 2013b and 2013c).   
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4. ITALIAN FIRMS: FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND CREDIT CRUNCH 
In view of the banks’ centrality in supporting companies’ financial structures, we 
now focus more closely on an analysis of bank lending flows (Figure 3), especially 
starting in 2008, when credit crunch became widespread.  
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Source: Our processing of Eurostat – Financial Accounts 
 
In actual fact, the negative trend in credit flows is also linked to demand factors, as 
can be seen from the trend in investments (which in this case include all 
investments in tangible and intangible fixed assets in relation to the balance sheet 
total), which slowed dramatically from 2008 onwards, remaining at very low levels 
at least for the following two years in all countries (Figure 4). 
 








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Italy France Germany Spain
 
 12 
Source: Our processing of BACH data set 
 
The extent of financial constraints for the various size categories of company and 
concerns about the difficulty in accessing finance can be analysed with the aid of 
the six-monthly “Survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the Euro area (SAFE)” 
conducted by the European Central Bank. The data presented in the report were 
collected through a survey of companies in the Euro area. The companies in the 
sample were selected randomly from the Dun & Bradstreet database of firms. The 
sample was stratified by firm size class, area of business and country. The total 
Euro area sample size was 7,510 firms, of which 6,960 had fewer than 250 
employees. Table 5 enables us to evaluate the importance of “Access to finance” as 
a key concern. 
 
Table 5 Percentage of firms reporting “Access to finance” as their 
principal concern  
    2009H1 2009H2 2010H1 2010H2 2011H1 2011H2 2012H1 2012H2 
Italy 
Large     18.2 14.4 15.5 17.1 27.5 19.9 15.0 
SMEs   14.7 20.4 13.7 16.1 14.2 19.0 23.4 18.4 
 Micro 19.8 19.6 12.7 14.7 13.2 17.2 24.6 16.6 
  Small 9.6 22.4 17.7 19.7 16.9 21.7 20.5 22.4 
  Medium 2.7 20.1 10.7 15.4 13.8 22.4 22.9 19.9 
Total     20.0 13.8 15.9 14.8 20.8 22.7 17.7 
France 
Large     5.1 10.7 4.2 11.4 18.4 11.1 9.6 
SMEs   18.6 11.4 12.2 13.0 16.1 13.4 13.2 13.1 
 Micro 19.3 16.5 15.5 18.1 22.7 15.2 13.8 14.5 
  Small 15.3 7.0 12.5 13.3 13.5 13.0 14.0 11.8 
  Medium 21.7 9.0 6.8 5.2 9.6 11.1 11.4 11.9 
Total     8.8 11.6 9.5 14.3 15.4 12.4 11.8 
Germany 
Large     13.9 7.1 8.5 6.3 2.8 11.3 8.4 
SMEs   15.3 18.1 11.2 12.0 11.0 11.0 9.5 8.5 
 Micro 11.5 22.6 13.1 12.5 9.6 13.8 12.0 10.7 
  Small 18.9 15.5 13.9 14.0 14.1 10.2 10.1 7.4 
  Medium 15.4 16.1 6.5 9.2 9.2 8.9 6.4 7.3 
Total     16.5 9.7 10.6 9.2 8.0 10.2 8.4 
Spain 
Large     24.7 21.6 19.3 15.3 25.6 25.8 21.1 
SMEs   26.0 34.1 23.3 25.0 24.4 29.2 27.2 25.1 
 Micro 22.1 30.6 23.8 22.9 25.0 30.5 26.5 23.9 
  Small 28.2 39.7 23.5 27.6 21.8 27.0 29.1 27.1 
  Medium 33.0 34.9 21.4 26.9 26.7 28.5 26.2 25.9 
Total     31.7 22.8 23.5 22.1 28.3 26.8 24.0 
Source: Our processing of microdata/data set from the Survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the Euro 
area (SAFE) 
 
For the majority of countries, “Access to finance” as a concern peaked in 2009H2; 
after that it declined or remained stable for most Euro area SMEs, except for Italy, 
where recently, in 2012H1 this concern peaked at a level even higher than in 
2009H2. Moreover, for Italy the situation improved in the last period surveyed for 
all size classes except small firms, for which it peaked during that period. In 
absolute terms, access to finance is a matter of greatest concern for Spanish SMEs, 
followed by Italian ones.  
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Financing constraints therefore appear to be particularly tight for Italian firms. 
Similar indications are obtained from an assessment of the net percentage of 
respondents reporting an increase (+) or decrease (-) in their need for bank loans 




Table 6 SMEs’ need for bank loans – Net percentage of respondents 
reporting an increase (+) or decrease (-) over the preceding 6 months 
 2009 H1 2009 H2 2010 H1 2010 H2 2011 H1 2011 H2 2012 H1 2012 H2 
Germany 9% 13% 0% 0% -3% 1% -6% -4% 
Spain 12% 19% 6% 6% 5% 8% 4% 5% 
France 6% 7% 1% 16% 12% 8% 10% 6% 
Italy 19% 28% 8% 12% 12% 19% 15% 12% 
Source: Our processing of microdata/data set from the Survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the Euro 
area (SAFE) 
 
Regarding needs for external financing in all the largest Euro area countries, 
except for Germany, on balance SMEs reported an increased need for bank loans, 
particularly during the second half of 2009. The net percentage of SMEs reporting 
an increased need was especially high in Spain and above all in Italy, which may be 
linked to the high net percentage of SMEs in Italy reporting a steep decline in 
profitability. 
 
Table 7 Availability of bank loans - Net percentage of respondents 
reporting an increase (+) or decrease (-) over the preceding 6 months 
 2009 H1 2009 H2 2010 H1 2010 H2 2011 H1 2011 H2 2012 H1 2012 H2 
Germany -24% -32% -8% -2% -6% -1% -1% 7% 
Spain -51% -48% -16% -20% -17% -26% -30% -17% 
France -19% -14% -2% -13% -14% -19% -21% -18% 
Italy -26% -29% -6% 1% -9% -27% -27% -7% 
Source: Our processing of microdata/data set from the Survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the Euro 
area (SAFE) 
 
On balance, SMEs in all the Euro area countries show a (in some cases 
considerable) deterioration in the availability of bank loans (in the form of new 
loans or the renewal of existing loans). For all the periods (Table 7), Spanish SMEs 
report the lowest availability, with French SMEs experiencing fewest problems 
until 2010. From 2010H2 the net percentage of French SMEs reporting a 
deterioration in the availability of bank loans increased. In Italy the situation 
partially improved from 2010H1 until 2011H2 and then deteriorated drastically. 
The net percentage of German SMEs reporting a deterioration in the availability of 
bank loans significantly decreased from 2010 H1 onward.  









Figure 5 Access to credit in relation to size of Italian firm (3 months 
percentage variations) 
 
Source: Banca d’Italia, Financial Stability Report n. 5, April 2013   
 
In recent months bank lending has been contracting at a similar pace among all 
sizes of firm. Access to credit continues to be tighter for smaller businesses, since 
their capacity to tap alternative sources of finance is lower. Medium-sized and 
large firms dealt with the credit squeeze by means of large bond issues. Signs of a 
credit crunch can be inferred from the high percentage of smaller firms declaring 
that they had not obtained the credit requested (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 Share of credit-rationed firms (per cent) 
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Source: Banca d’Italia, Financial Stability Report n. 5, April 2013   
 
Figure 6 shows the percentage of manufacturing firms reporting that they had 
applied to a bank or financial company for credit within the last three months and 
been refused. From the graph it is clear that access to credit continues to be tighter 
for smaller businesses. The percentage of the latter declaring that they had not 
obtained the credit requested was considerably higher than in the larger size 
classes. 
Another important point is the cost of funding for the different categories of firms. 
Figure 7 describes the trend in interest rates on banks’ loans to firms in Italy by 
firm size and area of business. It clearly emerges that SMEs, especially those in 
manufacturing, pay an increasing higher cost than larger corporations. 
 
Figure 7 Interest rates on loans in relation to firm size (percent) 
 
Source: Banca d’Italia 2013, Annual Report 2012, Figure 14.9  
 
In contrast with previous years, the reduction of bank credit affected not only 
companies in fragile financial conditions but also those with sounder balance 
sheets (Table 8); for these latter companies the reduction largely, but not only, 
reflects the replacement of credit with bond issues. Small firms felt the effects of 
credit restrictions the most. 
 
Table 8 Trends in lending by creditworthiness^ of firms in Italy: 12-
month percentage change 
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 Sound Vulnerable Risky 
Dec 2010 4.1% 1.5% -6.5% 
Dec 2011 4.1% 1.0% -5.4% 
Dec 2012 -3.1% -1.7% -7.2% 
^ The data refer to a sample of some 340,000 firms, distributed among the different risk classes on the basis of 
to their Z-scores (assigned by CERVED on the basis of a number of balance-sheet indicators). Firms are defined 
as “sound” with Z-scores of 1 (high safety), 2 (safety), 3 (high solvency), and 4 (solvency); “vulnerable” with Z-
scores of 5 (vulnerability) and 6 (high vulnerability); and “risky” with Z-scores of 7 (risk), 8 (high risk) and 9 
(very high risk) 
Source: Banca d’Italia, Financial Stability Report n. 5, April 2013   
 
The analysis therefore reveals signs of a credit crunch not only for SMEs but also 
for sound corporations, perhaps indicating a structural problem within the Italian 
banking system, where intermediaries may be less specialised and not sufficiently 
equipped to assess the creditworthiness of companies, especially those operating 
in the most innovative sectors. 
The crisis should finally provide the opportunity for opening up new channels of 
financing, as an alternative to bank credit. 
 
 
5. THE EXIT STRATEGIES 
In many European countries the restoration of a satisfactory flow of financing to 
firms, especially SMEs, is the essential precondition for escaping from the current 
recession. Credit crunch exit strategies are at the centre of the debate and of policy 
makers’ attention, at both the national and the international levels. Italy is a special 
case for a number of reasons: the particularly high importance of bank lending, the 
relative underdevelopment of a number of aspects of the financial system affecting 
firms’ ability to access capital markets (Panetta 2013), high general government’s 
commercial debts to companies, and last but not least banks’ difficulties arising 
from a sharp increase in NPLs and the consequent need for higher loan provisions, 
in a situation of squeezed margins.  
Given this situation, it must be taken as read that in the short term the Italian 
banking system is not capable of restoring the flow of credit companies need. It is 
thus clear that the slackening of financial constraints for firms, and for SMEs in 
particular, will have to pass through alternative channels, as the July 2013 IMF 
Mission also stated. Therefore, supported by a wide-ranging debate, the policy 
makers3 have been focusing for some time on measures to develop these channels, 
including tailor-made legislation. Some actions have already been taken and others 
are in the pipeline.  
One initial measure is the repayment of the public sector's debt to Italian 
businesses, estimated at around 90/100 billion Euro. In the last years, the 
excessive public sector deficit was one of the main causes for the delay in these 
repayments. Repayments have now been scheduled over two or three years and 
                                                        
3 Reference can be made to the countless articles on this topic that have recently appeared in the press. First 
and foremost, see http://www.ilsole24ore.com/. 
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this has been made possible, above all, by Italy’s exit in June 2013 from the 
infraction procedure for excessive public sector deficit (the country has been 
below the critical 3 per cent deficit/GDP ratio since the start of 2013). Since 2013 
repayments are due by 60 days, thanks a new EC legislation. 
Below we offer an overview of financial channels which may be used as an 
alternative, or in addition, to bank lending and the measures intended to 
encourage their development. We will then provide a more detailed discussion of 
the opportunities and obstacles relating to the birth and expansion of the bond 
market for SMEs (corporate bonds and securities generated through the 
securitisation of credit to SMEs).  
1. Bond market. The Italian government’s “Decree for Growth” (Decree 
Law 83/2012, art. 32) eliminated a number of fiscal and other 
constraints which discouraged the issue of corporate bonds by unlisted 
firms. The decree related to the so called “mini bonds”, or financing 
bills/commercial papers (CP) at 1-36 months (previously 3-12) and 
bonds with duration of at least 36 months. It envisages the involvement 
of a sponsor intermediary to provide assistance to issuers, market 
making and liquidity, certify the firm’s latest financial statements and 
place the bonds with “qualified investors” (as defined by art. 100 of the 
Consolidation Law on Financial Institutions). The issuer is able to 
benefit from a number of tax breaks typical of corporate bonds, and 
write off the interest paid against tax. The first issues by unlisted 
medium-large firms were large in size and in some cases acted as 
drivers for subsequent take-overs, as in the case of Cerved, acquired by 
CVC funds in February 2013. There are still significant barriers to the 
issue of instruments of this kind by smaller-sized firms, due to problems 
on both the demand and the supply sides, to be described in greater 
detail below.  
2. The “Fondo di Centrale di Garanzia (FCG)”, or SME Guarantee Facility. 
The FCG, which has been in operation for more than ten years, is a 
public facility backed up by Government guarantees which provides 
guarantees to banks and intermediaries on lending to financially sound 
SMEs in all areas of business. It has been beefed up with effect from 
2009 with an increase in Government resources and the gradual 
expansion of the categories of eligible beneficiaries to include firms in 
temporary difficulty (Bartiloro et al., 2012). However, many operators 
are unaware of its existence and it is underused. One possible way of 
extending its operations would be to enable the FCG to provide 
guarantees to investors in corporate bonds: this might encourage 
foreign investors, now already interested in the mini bond business, to 
increase their involvement in Italy.  
3. Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP). The CDP (“Bank for Savings and Loans”) 
is a joint stock corporation principally owned by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (MEF) (80.1 per cent) and by a group of banking 
foundations (18.4 per cent). Most deposits are in the form of post-office 
savings accounts. Since 2009 it has been providing medium and long-
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term loans to SMEs through the banking channel in accordance with 
clearly defined ceilings; since 2010, with other private investors, it 
established a private equity fund for SMEs (Fondo Italiano 
d’Investimento). Its operations to support SMEs could be reinforced 
both through participation in funds with the specific mission of 
investing in bonds issued by SMEs or the relative securitised 
instruments, and through the provision of guarantees on these 
securities. 
4. The European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Investment Fund 
(EIF). Lines of intervention are in operation on specific EU programmes 
to aid SMEs: loans, guarantees and equity financing. For the medium and 
long term (2014-20 programme), the European Commission has put 
forward proposals for a new generation of both short and medium-long 
term financial instruments for SMEs, also involving loans, guarantees 
and equity financing. Italy’s level of use of these facilities is relatively 
low compared to France and Germany and it is in this area that action is 
necessary in the immediate term. 
The European Commission and EIB are also working on risk sharing 
instruments (European Commission and the European Investment Bank 
Group, 2013). The aim is to combine the lending capacity of the EIB and 
the European Investment Fund as well as resources from national 
promotional banks to finance special activities in EU priority areas 
(Draghi, 2013). Another hypothesis is the purchase of asset-backed 
securities by the Commission and the EIB, with the added aim of 
revitalising the market in these instruments. 
5. Securitisation and covered bonds to guarantee bank lending to SMEs. 
The aim is to revitalise a market which has traditionally been 
underdeveloped in Italy but which has also been seriously penalised 
everywhere by the sub prime crisis. At the European level, there is the 
need for regulation on the aspects hindering the recovery of the ABS 
market, with measures to promote transparent, useful securitisation to 
benefit companies in general, including SMEs. The aim is to establish a 
uniform framework with other instruments with regard to aspects such 
as risk, rating and duration (Draghi, 2013). In relation to these 
instruments, two aspects require monitoring in the immediate term: 
firstly, the scope for banks to use them for refinancing with the ECB. In 
the case of Italy, the second aspect is the provision of a specific system 
of guarantees to encourage institutional investors to buy bonds the 
underlying instruments of which are bank loans to small and medium 
enterprises. In Italy, work is underway on a proposal to amend law 130 
of 1999 on securitisation, to favour the development of instruments of 
this kind.  
6. New credit intermediaries. The reference here is to credit funds, widely 
developed in a number of contexts, including the USA. These funds 
provide credit to SMEs further to due diligence, and then securitise the 
credit for retail sale. Funds’ capital would have to be underwritten by 
institutional investors. Typically, credit funds form part of the shadow 
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banking system, and before they can be introduced, legislation is 
required to establish the relevant regulatory perimeter. Legislation is 
currently being drafted on this, and if approved quickly it could have a 
high impact on the financing of businesses, by directing institutional 
deposits towards this area.  
7. Venture capital and private equity. The Italian asset management 
industry is underdeveloped in general and in particular with regard to 
specialist vehicles for financing SMEs. This situation is partly explained 
by the fact that many small Italian companies are family owned, and by 
the extreme reluctance of family-based capitalism to open up 
businesses’ equity structures to outside investors. Another reason is 
companies’ traditional high degree of dependence on bank lending, 
although the bank-firm relationship has been severely weakened during 
the last few years. In order to overcome this impasse, actions of various 
kinds are required: by policy makers, to introduce tax breaks to 
facilitate institutional investors (problematical due to the parlous 
condition of government finances); by banks and other intermediaries, 
the CDP and the banking foundations, to promote vehicles of this kind; 
and by banks, to provide services that assist companies in their entry 
onto the market alongside their traditional lending operations. 
However, none of this will be effective unless firms accept the need to 
open their ownership structures to outside investors.   
8. Institutional investors. Compared to other countries, in Italy the role of 
institutional investors in the acquisition of corporate equity is very low. 
One of the reasons is the firm cronical reluctancy in opening equity 
capital to outside investors; to this end a strong cultural change is 
required. The reinforcement of this role, to be achieved first and 
foremost through regulatory changes, could have a major impact for 
unlisted companies in the medium term, especially through the 
investment of the technical reserves of insurance companies. 
Amendments to the regulations of their supervisory body, the IVASS, to 
allow this are currently on the drawing board. 
9. Crowdfunding. Italy was the first European country to adopt specific 
legislation for the development of crowdfunding platforms (Decree Law 
no. 179 of 18 October 2012, known as the Growth Decree 2.0). This was 
followed by resolution no. 18592 dated 26 June 2013 of the Italian Stock 
Exchange Regulator (Consob), issuing a regulation covering equity 
crowdfunding (the raising of venture capital by innovative start-ups 
using on-line portals). These platforms are still in their infancy in Italy 
compared to other countries, but in the light of the new regulatory 
framework, the potential for the retail raising of venture capital for 
innovative start-ups is high. 
Table 9 summarises the main aims of the instruments/actions described above 
and specifies their implementation status and possible short-term impact in 
reducing credit crunch. 
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Table 9 Instruments and actions for the creation/reinforcement of financing channels for SMEs other than bank 
loans  
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The majority of these actions (some of which still only exist on paper) aim to 
overcome the acknowledged weak points of the Italian financial system by aiming 
to extend the structure and complexity of markets, intermediaries and 
instruments, first and foremost in order to develop capital markets for SMEs, 
previously neglected due to the preference for traditional bank credit (Banca 
d’Italia, 2013b). 
Below, we will assess the actions proposed for the development of equity and bond 
markets for SMEs, identifying the main obstacles and the specific actions to be 
introduced to overcome them. We will also outline the role banks may play in 
establishing this bank-company-market linkage, currently seriously lacking in the 
Italian banking system. 
With the introduction of the new legislation covering the issue of commercial 
papers and corporate bond by unlisted firms, the volumes of bond issues by 
companies in this class have grown considerably. However, this only applies to 
medium-large firms. Mini bonds alone are unable to solve the problem of the 
financing flow for smaller firms, due to factors on both the demand and the supply 
sides, which require precise measures by a variety of players: firms, intermediaries 
and policy makers. 
Supply 
- Obstacles. The prerequisites for the issue of mini bonds actually exclude a 
large number of small firms: joint stock company status, turnover in excess 
of two million Euro, rating and financial statements certified by an auditing 
firm. To this point a relevant negative factor is the high level of opaqueness 
of Italian SMEs which is not comparable with other European countries. 
- Development actions. The smaller-sized companies which make up the 
connective tissue of the Italian economy must realise that bank credit is a 
scarce resource and will continue to be so in the near future, and that they 
must therefore start to do everything needed to access the bond market, by 
meeting the requirements set out above - especially financial statement 
auditing and the assignment of a credit rating.  
Demand 
- Obstacles. Mini bonds may only be purchased by “qualified” investors, but in 
Italy there are very few investors which specialise in this type of security. 
Investors are generally in search of liquid securities, with credit ratings and 
low information-gathering costs, all lacking when the bonds are issued by 
SMEs that are generally smaller than the average of their European 
competitors. Therefore, mini bonds issued by most Italian SMEs will not be 
tempting for institutional investors, due to both their low liquidity and the 
high information costs involved.  
- Development actions.   
 Creation of funds with the specific mission of investing in mini 
bonds. Some banks (e.g. Mediobanca) have already done this.  
 More active approach by Italian institutional investors. Some sectors 
are less developed in Italy than in other countries (e.g. pension 
funds). Regulatory measures would be beneficial to allow these 
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investors, especially insurance companies, to draw on their technical 
reserves to increase their investments in securities issued by 
unlisted firms.  
 Active role of the CDP and banking foundations in the creation of 
funds specifically to invest in mini bonds and for direct investment.  
 Active role of banks to facilitate SMEs’ access to the markets. 
 A segment of Borsa Italiana, ExtraMOT Pro, for the bonds and 
financing bills of unlisted companies, has been in operation since 
February 2013.  
The banks’ possible role requires more in-depth discussion. The development of 
the corporate bond market opens out excellent opportunities for banks in the 
advisory, underwriting and placement areas. The fees generated by these activities 
could potentially make a significant contribution to intermediation margins at this 
time of declining profitability. This requires the development of specific skills only 
rarely found in Italian banks. It should also be remembered that while on the one 
hand the development of these activities will help to restore the bank-firm 
relationship as part of the bank-company-market circuit, on the other hand there is 
the risk that the banks may be crowded out: the most suitable firms for bond issue 
projects are the ones with the best ratings, which are currently also the most 
desirable for bank loan operations.  
Further, complementary actions should also be considered with regard to market 
instruments to simplify SMEs’ access to financing. First and foremost, the 
revitalisation of the ABS market, to allow the rating of products deriving from 
banks’ securitisation of tranches of SME loans. The creation of credit funds may 




Our analysis reinforces the finding that in Italy the credit available to the real 
economy is insufficient in terms not only of quantity but also of quality. Italian 
firms’ heavy reliance on bank credit compared to their international competitors 
means that the effects of the credit crunch are even more acute. This situation is 
affecting the types of firms which have the greatest difficulty in accessing 
alternative financing channels: the smallest companies, and thus also innovative 
firms, which have difficulty in demonstrating their financial sustainability and are 
therefore considered ineligible for bank credit even at normal times, especially in 
the initial states of their life cycles. The situation is rendered even more dramatic 
by the recent indications of credit rationing even in relation to companies with 
sound credit ratings. 
Although the Italian banking system reacted better than those of other countries 
during the initial phase of the financial crisis (Venturelli, 2012), proving relatively 
robust, the persistence of the crisis is revealing structural problems within it, 
including increasingly clear difficulty in selecting creditworthy firms from the rest 
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and sustaining businesses’ growth. The strict rules imposed by Basel 3 only 
partially justify this trend: the reasons for the situation lie a long way back, when 
the restructuring of the Italian banking system led to the disappearance of 
institutions which specialised in assessing companies’ financial soundness and 
investment prospects. The whole scenario is aggravated by the continuing failure 
to develop channels of financing other than bank credit. While on the one hand the 
crisis has revealed the underdevelopment of the Italian financial market, the 
insufficient role of institutional investors, the embryonic state of the corporate 
bond markets and the virtual non-existence of CP markets; on the other hand, it 
could finally provide the opportunity for the development of these channels. This 
need is so pressing that when the EU confirmed the ending of the infraction 
procedure against Italy for the exceeding of deficit limits, its concluding 
recommendations included support for the creation of non-banking channels of 
financing. 
Possible alternative sources include the new mini bond market, which requires 
three things if it is to take off as required: higher level of SMEs financial disclosure, 
investors interested in purchasing bonds of mini value and a regulatory context 
that facilitates the process. With regard to the first factor, the decrease of the level 
of opaqueness requires also a cultural and managerial change in SMEs. Turning to 
the second aspect, the CDP and many Italian banks and asset management firms 
are working to create specialised funds tasked with investing in mini bonds, which 
will thus be able to indirectly finance Italian companies. Finally, a new legislation 
for the creation of credit funds is needed. In more general terms, a solution is 
required to the problem of how to place the huge financing potential of the other 
institutional investors, especially the insurance companies, at the service of the 
real economy.  
In view of the complexity and variety of the measures and instruments which must 
be brought into play in an approach of cooperation rather than competition, the 
directing role of the national policy makers (MEF-Ministry for Economy and 
Finance and MISE-Ministero per lo Sviluppo Economico/Ministry of Economic 
Development) is essential, and they will need to drawn on the experience of the 
various foreign states where the various systems have been used most successfully 
in the past.  
A number of countries have already implemented schemes of this kind. France 
established a Banque publique d’investissement in 2012 to coordinate all 
programmes aimed at providing credit to small companies; more recently, it 
launched a proposal for further extending financing to SMEs by insurance 
companies: it is estimated that the current 216 billion (30 more than in 2008, no 
less) could be increased by a further 90.  
In some cases, these measures also need to link up effectively with those 
implemented by the European Commission and supranational organisations. Last 
but not least, the ECB’s strategy on the characteristics ABS and covered bonds are 
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